feat: resolve the API key from api_key= then COMFY_API_KEY, with a clear local error - #74
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…cal error A client now resolves its credential once, at construction, in a fixed and documented order: the explicit `api_key=` argument, then the `COMFY_API_KEY` environment variable. Against Comfy Cloud — which requires a key on every v2 endpoint — exhausting both raises the new `MissingApiKey` locally, naming the environment variable, instead of costing a round trip to be told `401`. The keyless surface is deliberately untouched. A deployment named by `COMFY_BASE_URL` may have no auth at all (self-hosted ComfyUI behind the API proxy), so there an unresolved key still means "send no credentials" and no error is raised; the error message points at that variable as the way out. Both sources are trimmed and a blank value counts as unset, so `COMFY_API_KEY=` in a shell profile and a key read from a file with a trailing newline both behave the way they look. `Comfy`/`AsyncComfy` gain an explicit `repr()` reporting the base URL and `authenticated=True|False`, backed by a new `ComfyLow.authenticated` property. The key is never logged (the SDK logs nothing), never rendered by any repr on the credential-bearing chain, and never placed in an exception message — all asserted in tests, since that is the most common way a credential ends up in someone's CI log. `comfy_low` is unchanged in behavior: it takes the key it is handed and reads no environment, because resolution is a `comfy_sdk` concern.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe SDK now resolves API keys from explicit arguments or ChangesCredential resolution and safe authentication state
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The change can still allow keyless clients for valid Comfy Cloud URLs with an explicit default port, causing a delayed 401 instead of the promised local error, and embedded credentials in base URLs may be exposed through client representations. These correctness and secret-handling risks should be fixed before merging. Suggested reviewers: Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Caller
participant Comfy
participant _resolve_api_key
participant ComfyLow
participant MissingApiKey
Caller->>Comfy: construct with api_key and base URL
Comfy->>_resolve_api_key: resolve explicit key or COMFY_API_KEY
_resolve_api_key->>ComfyLow: pass trimmed key or None
_resolve_api_key->>MissingApiKey: raise when Comfy Cloud has no key
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md
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Inline comments:
In `@src/comfy_low/transport.py`:
- Around line 151-156: Redact URL userinfo before rendering base_url in __repr__
for _Prepared (src/comfy_low/transport.py:151-156), ComfyLow
(src/comfy_low/transport.py:281-284), AsyncComfyLow
(src/comfy_low/transport.py:616-619), Comfy (src/comfy_sdk/client.py:204-207),
and AsyncComfy (src/comfy_sdk/client.py:316-318). Reuse one consistent sanitized
URL value so proxy credentials never appear in representations.
In `@src/comfy_sdk/client.py`:
- Around line 134-141: Update the Comfy Cloud detection around the base_url
comparison to normalize and compare scheme, host, and effective port, treating
an explicit HTTPS default port such as :443 as equivalent to
COMFY_CLOUD_BASE_URL. Preserve the existing MissingApiKey behavior for all
equivalent Comfy Cloud URLs, and add a regression test covering
COMFY_BASE_URL=https://cloud.comfy.org:443/.
In `@tests/test_api_key.py`:
- Around line 69-70: Update the affected client-construction tests in
test_api_key.py to close every Comfy and AsyncComfy instance through the
appropriate with or async with context manager, splitting sync and async
lifecycle cases where necessary while preserving the existing assertions.
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📒 Files selected for processing (10)
CHANGELOG.mdREADME.mdsrc/comfy_low/transport.pysrc/comfy_sdk/__init__.pysrc/comfy_sdk/client.pysrc/comfy_sdk/exceptions.pytests/conftest.pytests/test_api_key.pytests/test_base_url_env.pytests/test_user_agent.py
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robinjhuang
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Approved — automated check passed.
Two review findings on the credential-resolution PR, plus a call site the review missed. Comfy Cloud was detected by string equality against COMFY_CLOUD_BASE_URL, so COMFY_BASE_URL=https://cloud.comfy.org:443/ — the same deployment with its default port written out — fell through to the keyless carve-out. That is the precise failure the local check exists to prevent: the caller gets an unauthenticated client and a server 401 on the first request instead of MissingApiKey at construction. Compare normalized origin (scheme, host, effective port) and path instead. The origin helper is the transport's, already used to decide whether a URL may carry the bearer token, so "same target" now has one definition rather than two; it is promoted from _origin to origin for the cross-package import. The path is part of the comparison so a deployment mounted under the same host stays keyless, and a test asserts that half too — the match has to be wide enough to catch Cloud and narrow enough to leave the neighbours alone. A base URL can itself carry a credential: COMFY_BASE_URL=https://user:token@ proxy.example is how a deployment behind an authenticating proxy is reached. Every repr printed it verbatim, which is the same CI-log leak the API key is carefully kept out of. Reprs now render a redacted form (***@host) while the transport keeps requesting against the URL as given, so the proxy credential is hidden from display, not taken away from the caller. This covers the five sites the review listed plus _ModelsBase.__repr__, which renders the same base URL and arrived with the models namespace after the review ran. Tests in test_api_key.py constructed clients they never closed, leaking an httpx transport per case. A constructed() helper closes whichever flavour it gets, which keeps each case one parametrized test across both clients instead of a sync copy and an async copy. Both regression tests fail against the previous code and pass against this one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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robinjhuang
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Approved — automated check passed.
ELI-5
If you forget your API key, the SDK now tells you so the moment you build a client — and tells you which environment variable to set — instead of letting the server say
401a round trip later. It also looks inCOMFY_API_KEYfor you, so you don't have to paste the key into your code at all.What changed
A client resolves its credential once, at construction, in a fixed order:
api_key=argument — it always wins;COMFY_API_KEYfrom the environment, when no argument was passed;MissingApiKey, raised locally, naming the environment variable.Both sources are trimmed and a blank value counts as unset, so
COMFY_API_KEY=in a shell profile and a key read from a file with a trailing newline both do the obvious thing. Both are re-read on every construction, matching howCOMFY_BASE_URLalready behaves.Comfy/AsyncComfyalso gain an explicitrepr()— base URL plusauthenticated=True|False, never the key — backed by a newComfyLow.authenticatedproperty.comfy_lowis otherwise unchanged: it takes the key it is handed and reads no environment, because resolution is acomfy_sdkconcern.The one judgment call: step 3 applies to Comfy Cloud only
The repo already documents, and tests, a surface that legitimately has no credential — "Self-hosted ComfyUI (behind the API proxy) | Omit — no key is sent, even implicitly" in the README, locked in by
tests/test_auth_headers.py. An unconditional "no key → raise" would delete that capability, so the error fires only when the resolved base URL is Comfy Cloud (the default). PointCOMFY_BASE_URLat anything else and an unresolved key means exactly what it has always meant: build the client, send no credentials. The error message namesCOMFY_BASE_URLfor precisely that reason — it redirects you to the path that still works rather than dead-ending.Consequence worth stating plainly: a serverless deployment does require a key but is also selected by
COMFY_BASE_URL, so a keyless serverless client is still a server401, as today. The SDK cannot tell a serverless URL from a self-hosted one, and guessing wrong would deny a working configuration.Second consequence: on the Cloud default, key resolution now runs before the transport validates
client_info, so a client built with both a badclient_infoand no key seesMissingApiKeyfirst. Base-URL validation still runs first of all, since it decides whether a key is required at all.Verification of the capability this denies
The new code path denies one thing: constructing a working keyless client against Comfy Cloud. Attempted it directly, read-only, against the live surface before shipping the dead-end:
Both a read and a probe are rejected unauthenticated, so a keyless Cloud client could only ever have produced that
401— the change replaces a guaranteed server rejection with a local one, and does not remove any reachable capability. The surviving keyless path is exercised live in the opposite direction:test_auth_headers.py::test_no_api_key_sends_no_authorization_header_at_allbuilds a keyless client against the stub server over real HTTP and asserts noAuthorizationheader arrives at all — still green, unmodified.Leak sweep — including the part this diff does not touch
Swept every public-surface object reachable from a client built with a sentinel key and rendered each through
repr(),str()andformat(): 13 objects, 0 render the key. 5 of those are on the credential-bearing chain this diff touched (Comfy,AsyncComfy,ComfyLow,AsyncComfyLow,_Prepared); the other 8 were not touched (AssetFactory,AsyncAssetFactory,JobFactory,AsyncJobFactory,Models,AsyncModels,Workflow,WorkflowFactory) and were pointed at by the same sweep, which is the half that would otherwise have gone unchecked. The remaining handle reprs (Job,AsyncJob,Asset,Output,AsyncOutput) need a live server to construct, so they were read instead: each renders only ids/status/paths, never its transport.grep -rn 'import logging\|print('oversrc/returns nothing — the SDK does no logging at all, which is how "never logged" holds.Tests
tests/test_api_key.pyis new, and every case runs against bothComfyandAsyncComfy:sendpaths are monkeypatched to raise, so any request attempted during construction surfaces as anAssertionErrorinstead of the expectedMissingApiKey;COMFY_API_KEY, theapi_key=argument, andCOMFY_BASE_URL; it is aComfyErrorwithcode="missing_api_key"andhttp_status is None;repr/strof the client, its transport and_Prepared, whichever source it came from; and a keyed client that gets a401back raises an error carrying no key;COMFY_BASE_URLdeployment still builds keyless and sends nothing, still picks upCOMFY_API_KEYwhen set, and Cloud named explicitly (trailing slash included) still requires a key;Bearer ….tests/conftest.pygains an autouse fixture stripping an ambientCOMFY_API_KEY, mirroring the existingCOMFY_BASE_URLone: now that the SDK reads that variable, a key exported in a developer's shell would silently authenticate the clients the suite builds deliberately without one, turning the no-credentials-sent assertions green for the wrong reason. Three pre-existing tests that built a keyless client against the Cloud default (two intest_base_url_env.py, one intest_user_agent.py) now pass a key — none of them was about credentials.Acceptance criteria
COMFY_API_KEYread when no explicit keyrepr/str/ in an exception message, with a testUnexercised artifacts
The source ticket links two internal planning documents (a PRD section and a gameplan row) that specify the resolution order. Both are on an internal collaboration tool this worker cannot reach, so the order implemented here comes from the ticket's own acceptance criteria, not from reading those documents — if they say something more specific about the self-hosted carve-out, that is the thing to check at review. The ticket's parent epic was likewise named but not fetched. No attachment was reachable and no comment on the ticket carried substantive detail.
Provenance
ruff check .clean;ruff format --check .45 files already formatted;mypy srcno issues in 17 files;pytest -q217 passed / 4 skipped (up from 213 passed pre-change);scripts/check_drift.pymodels in sync;scripts/check_public_repo_hygiene.pyno internal-only references. Live read-only falsification againstcloud.comfy.orgas quoted above.Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
COMFY_API_KEYenvironment variable.MissingApiKeyandAPI_KEY_ENV_VARexports.Documentation